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I. Of the many works that crossed from France into Germany during the 
"long" eighteenth century, none took as circuitous a route as Rameau's 
Nephew. Begun by Diderot in 1761 but never published during his lifetime, 
the dialogue was among the works sent to Catherine the Great after his death 
in 1784. A copy of the manuscript was brought to Jena late in 1804, where it 
was read by Schiller and passed on to Goethe, who immediately set about 
translating it into German. Goethe's translation was published in the Spring 
of 1805 but, as Goethe later complained, made little impact on the German 
reading public.' There was, however, one notable exception: Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel. 
Hegel's interpretation of Diderot's dialogue in his 1807 Phenomenology 
of Spirit has long been an topic of considerable interest. Marxists-and, for 
that matter, Marx himself-have regarded the Phenomenology's discussion 
of Diderot as illustrative of Hegel's interest in the social and economic 
foundations of modern s ~ c i e t y . ~  For Lionel Trilling, it marked an important 
step in the genesis of the modem ideal of "a~thenticity."~ More recently, the 
tensions between Diderot's "dialogizing" of the Enlightenment and the 
' For the early publishing history of Rameau S Nephew, see Rokand Mortier, Diderot 
en Allemagne (1750-1850) (Paris, 1954), 254-63; for Goethe's complaint see "Nach-
tragliches zu Rameaus Neffe" in Goethes Werke (36 vols.; Stuttgart, 1866-68), XXV, 290, 
and 269-96. 
Mam to Engels, 15 April 1869. Later Marxian critics include Georg Lukacs, The 
Young Hegel, tr. Rodney Livingstone (London, 1975), 495-97; Henri Mougin, "Hegel et le 
Neveu de Rameau," Europe, 24 (1946), 1-1 1; Gottfried Stiehler, " 'Rameau's Neffe' und 
die 'Phanomenologie des Geistes' von Hegel," Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der 
Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin: Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe, 13 
(1964), 163-67; and Marie-Jeanne Konigson, "Hegel, Adam Smith, et Diderot," Hegel et 
le Siicle des Lumiires, ed. Jacques D'Hondt (Paris, 1974), 5 1-70. 
' Sincerity and Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 26-52; cf. E. J. Hundert, "A 
Satire of Self-Disclosure: From Hegel Through Rameau to the Augustans," JHI, 47 (1986), 
235-48. 
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Hegelian dialectic have been explored by a number of commentator^.^ Less 
attention, however, has been paid to the fact that the words Hegel appropri- 
ated were not, strictly speaking, Diderot's, but rather came from Goethe's 
translat i~n.~Before Rameau 's Nephew could appear in the pages of Hegel's 
Phenomenology, it first passed into German in a translation that, no less than 
Hegel, inserted the text into a rather different context from the one in which it 
had originated. 
A consideration of Hegel's appropriation of RameauS Nephew thus 
involves us in questions about the transporting, translating, and transposing 
of works across borders, languages, and genres. I will begin by examining 
briefly how Goethe went about presenting an eighteenth century French text 
to a nineteenth-century German audience. I will then explore, at greater 
length, how Hegel went about situating this most peculiar of dialogues into 
his most baffling of books. Finally, I will reflect on some of the tensions 
between what Diderot wrote and what Hegel attempted to do with it. 
11. "Now, think of a city like Paris," Goethe told Eckermann, bemoaning 
the "isolated, miserable sort of life" to which German intellectuals had been 
condemned. In Paris one could find "all of the leading minds of a great 
kingdom all together at the same spot, mutually instructing and advancing 
one another through daily contact, conflict, and rivalry." The leading Ger- 
man intellectuals, in contrast, were scattered about: "There is one in Vienna, 
another in Berlin, another in Konigsberg, another in Bonn or Diisseldorf, all 
fifty to a hundred miles away from each other, so that personal contact and 
personal exchange of ideas count as rare events." In Paris "the best from the 
realms of nature and art from throughout the world lies open for daily 
inspection," while "every passage over a bridge or a square recalls a mighty 
past" and "every street corner has evolved into a piece of history." It was a 
city where "men such as Molibre, Voltaire, Diderot, and the like have kept up 
a current of intellect such as has not been found in a single spot anywhere else 
in the entire ~ o r l d . " ~  Weimar, quite clearly, was not Paris. 
Rameau S Nephew was so thoroughly a creature of Paris that the mere 
thought of rendering it into German might have dismayed a weaker soul than 
Goethe. Moi and Lui begin a conversation at the CafC de la RCgence that will 
Hans Robert Jauss, "The Dialogical and the Dialectical Neveu de Rameau; or, The 
Reciprocity between Diderot and Socrates, Hegel and Diderot" in Question and Answer: 
Forms of Dialogic Understanding, tr. Michael Hays (Minneapolis, 1989), 118-47; James 
Hulbert, "Diderot in the Text of Hegel: A Question of Intertextuality," Studies in 
Romanticism, 22 (1983), 267-91; David W. Price, "Hegel's Intertextual Dialectic: 
Diderot's Le Neveu de Rameau in the Phenomenology of Spirit," Clio, 20 (1991)' 223-33; 
and Suzanne Gearhart, The Interrupted Dialectic: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and their 
Tragic Other (Baltimore, 1992), 157-8 1. 
See Price, 226, for an exception to this generalization. 
Johann Peter Eckermann, Gesprache mit Goethe (Zurich, 1948), 628-29 (conversa- 
tion of 3 May 1827). 
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lead them from discussions of the contest between French and Italian styles 
in music to a consideration of the prospects for human autonomy. In between 
they will pass over such matters as the social utility of geniuses, the tension 
between aesthetics and morality, the proper upbringing of children, and the 
structure of social dependency, pausing from time to time as Lui loses 
himself in increasingly wilder pantomimes. Along the way the two will drop 
a host of names of contemporaries, some famous, some infamous, and a few 
quite obscure. 
For Goethe any understanding of Rameau's Nephew had to start by 
making sense of the context in which the work first appeared; and for him this 
meant seeing the book as Diderot's response to the opponents of the Encyclo- 
pedia. He appended to his translation, as an aid to the reader, a series of brief 
notes on individuals and subjects mentioned in the text, which-in an 
unintentional homage to Diderot's great machine de guerre-followed one 
another in alphabetical order. The bulk of these notes consist of brief sketches 
of the leading philosophes ("d'Alembert," "Montesquieu," "Voltaire"), 
their opponents ("Palissot," "Poinsinet," "Freron"), and prominent fig- 
ures in theater and music ("Dorat," "Duni," "Lully," "Rameau"). Goethe 
also included a discussion of "The Phi1osophes"-Palissot's 1760 comedy 
ridiculing the Encyclopedists-and followed it with a translation of 
Voltaire's letter to Palissot defending the philosophes.' The entry "Taste" 
discussed differences between French and German poetry and speculated on 
the relationship of "taste" and "genius," while "Music" explained the 
contest between French and Italian musical styles in eighteenth-century 
Paris, concluding that French art during this period was "mannered in a way 
that is almost unbelievable to us and divorced from all authentic artistic truth 
and simpli~ity."~ But the most important of the notes for understanding how 
Goethe approached the work he translated is the one entitled, appropriately 
enough, "Rameau's Nephew." 
Since the note is nestled between "Rameau" and "Tencin (Madame 
de)," the reader might well expect that it would discuss the life and career of 
Jean-Frangois Rameau, lapsed seminarian, unsuccessful composer, impover- 
ished harpsichord teacher, loud-mouthed wit, and social pa ra~ i t e .~  This is not 
the case. Indeed, at the time of Goethe's translation, Jean-Philippe Rameau's 
odd relation had lapsed into such utter obscurity that Schiller assumed he was 
a fiction created by Diderot.lo Goethe's note instead is devoted to a discus- 
'Goethe had seen the play as a child; see The Autobiography of Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe, tr. John Oxenford (2 vols.; Chicago, 1974), I, 96. 
See Goethe's notes to his translation of Rameaus Neffe, in Goethes Werke, XXV, 268. 
See Milton F. Seiden, "Jean-Francois Rameau and Diderot's Nevue," Diderot 
Studies, I (1949), 143-91. 
'O Schiller's letter to Korner described the work as "ein Gesprach welches der 
(fingirte) Neffe des Musicus Rameau mit Diderot fiihrt," Schillers Briefwechsel rnit 
Korner (4 vols.; Leipzig, 1847), IV, 484. Seiden, 186, notes that the Asstzat-Tourneux 
edition of  Diderot's Oeuvres mistranslates the letter so that "fingirte" modifies 
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sion of Diderot's book itself and to its role in the conflict between the 
philosophes and their enemies. Diderot, Goethe wrote, 
uses all the powers of his mind to depict the flatterers and parasites in 
the full extent of their depravity, in no way sparing their patrons. At 
the same time the author is concerned to classify his literary enemies 
as precisely the same kind of hypocrites and flatterers. 
In what Goethe regarded as a masterstroke, Diderot combined this portrait of 
his enemies with a discussion of controversies surrounding French music, 
thus imparting a "consistency and dignity" to the work that it might other- 
wise have lacked. 
for while in the person of Rameau's nephew a decidedly dependent 
nature, capable under outside stimulus of every evil, is expressed, 
and thus arouses our scorn and even our hate, yet these feeling are 
mitigated because he is manifested as a not entirely talentless, 
fantastical-practical musician. 
Diderot thus managed to create a figure who epitomized the "entire species" 
of "flatterers and toadies" but nevertheless appeared as "an individually 
characterized being."" 
For Goethe the Nephew was the creature of a particular culture. While the 
German, he argued, can live happily in isolation from others, the Frenchman 
"is a social man, and he lives and exists, he stands and falls in society."'* 
And the society in which he stands and falls is singularly incapable of 
judging the talents of individuals. Disputes over artistic merit invariably 
degenerate into attacks on an opponent's moral failings, which in Goethe's 
eyes is to lose sight of what ought to be at issue. While one's wife or children 
and one's fellow-citizens or superiors may be able to judge the moral worth 
of one's actions, one's morality is not properly a concern of society at large. 
Morality (Sittlichkeit) involves demands that individuals make upon them- 
selves, and the question of how well an individual lives up to these demands 
must be judged by God and by the individual's own heart. Society makes 
claims on the individual only in his role "as a man of ability, activity, 
intellect, and talent."13 Thus what is ultimately at issue in the dispute 
"Gesprach" rather than "Neffe," thus giving the impression that Schiller thought that the 
dialogue, and not the Nephew, was imaginary. For Goethe's discussion of doubts about the 
Nephew's existence, which were not put to rest until the 1820s, see-his "Nachtragliches zu 
Rameaus Neffe," in Rameaus Neffe, 296-99. 




l 3  Ibid.,285. 
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between Palissot and Diderot is a fundamental disagreement about the social 
relevance of morality, and it is this that Goethe sees as animating Rameau 's 
Nephew. Palissot attacks the philosophes for their moral failings, while 
Rameau's Nephew portrays the social depravity of the clique that stood 
behind Palissot's Les Philosophes.14 
111. Goethe's translation of Rameau's Nephew was published in May 
1805. Less than a year later, Hegel began work on second half of his 
Phenomenology of Spirit, into which he inserted three quotations from 
Goethe's translation.15 To insert Rameau 's Nephew into the Phenomenology 
is to wrap a riddle in an enigma. For if Rameau's Nephew is a frequently 
puzzling book, the difficulties of the Phenomenology are legendary. It has 
annoyed generations of readers, beginning with its own author. In a letter 
written to Schelling shortly after its publication Hegel bemoaned the 
"wretched confusion" that had reigned during the writing, publishing, print- 
ing, and distribution of the book and begged forgiveness for the "want of 
form in the last sections" of the work.16 Into the midst of this confusion 
Hegel dropped Rameau's eccentric nephew. 
The Nephew appears in Chapter VI of the Phenomenology, the point 
where the book significantly expands its focus. The first five chapters of the 
Phenomenology are concerned with "shapes of consciousness" (Gestalten 
des BewuJtseins), examining relationships between consciousness and the 
world that range from primitive attempts to designate the "here" and the 
"now" to reason's attempts to observe the laws of nature and postulate moral 
laws. But with Chapter VI-"Geist"-the Phenomenology moves beyond 
the reconstruction of the stages through which an individual subject passes 
upon engaging in systematic self-reflection and considers "real Spirits, 
actualities in the strict meaning of the word" which "instead of being shapes 
merely of consciousness, are shapes of a world" (Gestalten einer Welt)." 
Chapter VI surveys three such "worlds": "The True Spirit. Ethical 
Life" (Der wahre Geist. Die Sittlichkeit), "The Self-Estranged Spirit. Cul- 
ture" (Der sich entfremdete Geist. Die Bildung), and "The Self-certain 
Spirit. Morality" (Der seiner selbst gewisse Geist. Die Moralitat). The 
account of Sittlichkeit deals with the Greek polis, the account of Bildung 
embraces European culture from the rise of absolutist state, through the 
Enlightenment, to the French Revolution, while the discussion of Moralitat 
l4 Ibid., 286 
l5For a chronology of Hegel's work on the Phenomenology see the editors' note to 
Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede in 
Hegel, Gesammelte Werke (Hamburg, 1980), IX,46 1-63. 
l6 Letter to Schelling of 1 May 1807, in Hegel, Briefe von und an Hegel (4  vols.; 
Hamburg, 1952-60), I, 161-62. 
I' Hegel, Werke (20 vols.; Frankfurt, 1970), 111, 326 (Phenomenology ofspirit ,  trans. 
A. V .  Miller [Oxford, 19773, 265). 
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is less concerned with a particular epoch than with a specific way of thinking 
about moral problems: the ethics of conviction spawned by Kantian morality. 
The "worlds" Hegel examines are perhaps best understood as constellations 
of norms, values, and conventions which bind-and in some cases fail to 
bind-individuals together into a community. His use of the term "Geist" 
thus might be likened, as Judith Shklar suggested, to Montesquieu's ksprit 
gknkral: "the totality of attitudes, rules, institutions, habits and beliefs that 
make up a political culture."18 Hegel's attempt to articulate the values that 
animate these worlds does not, however, confine itself to an analysis of the 
political culture of each period. Rather, his account takes its point of depar- 
ture from the interpretation of a few crucial literary texts. The analysis of the 
world of Sittlichkeit draws heavily from the Antigone, while the world of 
Moralitat is epitomized by the account of the "beautiful soul" in Goethe's 
Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre and Jacobi's W~ldemar . '~The domain of 
"Bildung" finds its voice in the cynical observations and mad pantomimes 
of Rameau's nephew. 
If the Nephew would seem to be an unlikely spokesman for "culture," it 
should be remembered that Hegel's use of the term "Bildung" was itself 
rather odd.20 The term originated in Pietist theology where Christ's "image" 
(Bi1d)-present in the soul of man insofar as man had been "formed (bildet) 
in the image of God-was the ideal which must guide the cultivation 
(Bildung) of one's talents and disposition^.^' It was also employed within the 
natural philosophy of Paracelsus, Bohme, and Leibniz to denote the develop- 
ment or "unfolding" of certain potentialities within an organism.22 It was 
used in something approximating this sense by Moses Mendelssohn in his 
1784 response to the question "What is Enlightenment?"-an essay that 
Hegel copied out, while a gymnasium student, into one of the notebooks that 
he carried with him throughout his life.23 The term also had wide usage in 
pedagogical theorists read by the young Hegel, such as Joachim Heinrich 
Campe, who were concerned with how the "development" (Ausbildung) and 
"education" (Bildung) of the citizenry might be fostered through pedagogi- 
I s  Judith Shklar, Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's 
Phenomenologv of Mind (Cambridge, 1976), 42-43, 142-45. 
l9 For Goethe, see Hyppolite, 501 and Donald Verene, Hegel's Recollection: A Study of 
Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit (Albany, 1985), 100; for Jacobi, see the editors' 
note in Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, IX, 5 18. 
20 See Shklar, 44, 15 1 and Trilling, 43. 
21 See E. L. Stahl, Die Religiose und die Humanitatsphilosophische Bildungsidee 
(Bern, 1934), 97-101 and Hans Sperber, "Der Einfluss des Pietismus auf die Sprache des 
18 Jahrhunderts," Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift f i r  Literaturwissenschaft und Geistes- 
geschichte, VIII (1930), 508-9. 
22 Rudolf Vierhaus, "Bildung," in 0.Brunner, W. Linze, R. Koselleck (eds.), 
Geschichtliche Grundbegrlre (8 vols.; Stuttgart, 1972-73), I, 5 10. 
*'See Johannes Hoffmeister, Dokumente t u  Hegels Entwicklung (Stuttgart, 1936), 
140-43. 
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cal reform.24 Finally, the term enjoyed an even more influential usage in the 
writings of Herder-most notably his Auch einer Philosophie der Geschichte 
zur Bildung der Menschenheit (1774). Here Bildung denoted not simply 
"education" or "teaching" but rather all of those experiences which give a 
people a coherent identity and a sense of a common destiny.25 
In the Phenomenology Hegel employed the concept in two related ways. 
In Preface and Introduction to the book he spoke of the "Bildung of Spirit" 
or the "Bildung of consciousness"--employing the terms to describe the 
process by which spirit and consciousness develop. In Chapter VI the term 
denotes a particular historical period in which individuals have assumed 
responsibility for their own self-fa~hioning.~~ What is striking in both uses is 
that Hegel eschews the conventional image of Bildung as an organic unfold- 
ing of a form immanent in an individual or a people and instead presents 
Bildung as a process of relentless self-estrangement. 
In the short Introduction to the Phenomenology Hegel described con- 
sciousness's education as a "pathway of doubt, or more precisely the way of 
despair" which leads to "a state of despair about all the so-called natural 
ideas, thoughts, and opinion^."^' Whatever remains within "the limits of a 
natural life" perishes if it is driven beyond itself. Consciousness, however, 
continually "suffers violence at its own hands," it constantly "goes beyond 
limits, and since these limits are its own, it is something that goes beyond 
itself."28 Zerrissenheit-the state of being tom to pieces-is the "natural" 
element of consciousness. As Hegel wrote in one of the odder aphorisms in 
his Jena notebooks, "A mended sock is better than a tom one; not so for self- 
consc io~sness . "~~  
Hegel's account in Chapter VI of the "world" of Bildung likewise dis- 
penses with any sense of Bildung as a process of organic or harmonious 
development. The "World of the Self-estranged Spirit" is "double, divided, 
and self-opposed," it is a world where nothing is "grounded within itself" 
and where everything "has its being in something outside of and alien to 
it."30 This sense that the modem age was distinguished by alienation and 
division pervaded Hegel's writings throughout the Jena p e r i ~ d . ~ '  Hence, even 
24 Vierhaus, 5 1 1 -1 5. 

25 Ibid., 515-17. 

26 Hegel, Werke, 111, 31-32, 73, 363-90 (Phenomenology, 16-17; 50; 297-321). See 

John H. Smith, The Spirit and its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel's Philosophy of 
Bildung (Ithaca, 1988), 200-201. 
*'Ibid., 111, 72-73 (49-50). For a discussion of this process, see Charles Taylor, "The 
Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.), Hegel: A 
Collection of Critical Essays (New York, 1972), 157-6 1. 
28 Ibid., 111, 74 (5 1). 
29 Ibid., 11, 558. For a discussion see Smith, 207. 
30 Hegel, Werke, 111, 361 (Phenomenologv, 295). 
For a discussion, see Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Moderniw, 
tr. F. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 16-3 1. 
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before work had begun on the Phenomenology, Hegel had come to see 
Bildung as a process marked by division and dismemberment, creating a 
world that was defined by its self-e~trangement.~~ All that he needed to find, 
as he wrestled with his increasingly unwieldy Bildungsroman of the Spirit, 
was a literary work that could play the same role, for the world of "the self- 
estranged spirit," that the Antigone had played vis-a-vis antiquity. With the 
appearance of Goethe's translation of Rameau's Nephew in the spring of 
1805, Hegel's search ended. 
IV. Hegel quoted Rameau 's Nephew three times in the Phenomenologv, 
an amount of attention matched by no other work. On none of these occa- 
sions, however, does Hegel account for the origin of the words enclosed 
within the quotation marks. The most he offers is the statement, at the start of 
the longest of his three quotations from the book, that the language spoken by 
the self-estranged spirit resembles "the madness of the musician" who, 
heaped upon each other and mixed up thirty arias, Italian, French, 

tragic, comic, of every sort of character; now with a base voice he 

descended into Hell, then, contracting his throat, he rent the vaults of 

heaven with a falsetto tone alternately raging and soothing, imperi- 

ous and mocking.33 

The passage quoted is memorable enough that readers of Goethe's translation 
might catch the reference. But Hegel's other two quotations are a good deal 
more obscure. The first occurs early in the discussion of the world of the self- 
estranged spirit when Hegel argues that in the world of culture, individuality 
has worth and standing only to the extent that it "forms [bildet] itself into 
what it is in itself." "Natural" individuality, he explains, is only an "as- 
sumed existence" (gemeinte Dasein), it is only a "kind [Art] of e ~ i s t e n c e . " ~ ~  
He then quotes a brief passage from Rameau 3 Nephew, explaining that 
"Kind" [Art] is not quite the same as espGce, "the most horrid of all 

nicknames; for it denotes mediocrity and expresses the highest de- 

gree of contempt." "Kind and "good of its kind" [in seiner Art 

gut] are, however, German expressions which add an air of honesty 

to this meaning, as if it were not really meant so badly; or, again, 

'' See, for example, Hegel, Werke, 11, 20-22 (translated by H. S. Hams and Walter 
Cerf as The Diflerence between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy [Albany, 
19771, 89-91). 
''Hegel, Werke, 111, 387 (3 17-18). Hegel quotes (23 1) Goethe's translation (Le Neveu 
de Rameau, ed. Jean Fabre [Geneva, 19631, 83; Rameau's Nephew and Other Works, tr. 
Jacques B ~ R u ~  and Ralph H.  Bowen [Indianapolis, 19561, 67). 

Ibid., 111, 364 (298). 
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consciousness is, in fact, not yet aware what "kind," and what 
"culture" and "reality" are.3s 
Hegel's third quotation from Rameau S Nephew occurs later in the Phenom- 
enology, in the course of his account of the struggle between faith and 
enlightenment. Hegel explains how the spirit of enlightenment so thoroughly 
permeates the domain of pure faith that it takes "complete possession of all 
the vitals and members of the unconscious idol." Quoting Diderot one last 
time, Hegel continues, "then 'one fine morning it gives its comrade a shove 
with the elbow, and bang! crash! the idol lies on the floor.' "36 
The first point to note about Hegel's use of Rameau's Nephew is that 
Hegel merged the words of Goethe's translation almost imperceptively into 
his own. The footnotes that take us out of Hegel's monstrous sentences and 
down to the bottom of the page, where we are reminded that another's words 
are being spoken, were added by later editors and translators. The Phenom- 
enology began its career without them. The only notice Hegel gives that 
another voice is speaking is the quotation marks that enclose his borrowings. 
It is up to the reader to know who speaks in those quotations, just as it is up to 
the reader to recognize that the discussion of the duties of sisters to brothers 
in the Phenomenology's analysis of ethical life summons up the Antigone. 
The readers of the Phenomenology are called upon to recognize such figures 
as Antigone, the Nephew, and the Beautiful Soul as sedimented layers of 
their own culture, as forms through which the world-spirit has passed and 
forms which they, having been shaped by the this spirit as well, can now 
recollect. 
Commentators have often noted a second peculiarity in Hegel's quota- 
tions from Rameau's Nephew: he uses them in rather different contexts than 
they occupy in Diderot's book.37 Take, for example, Hegel's quotation of the 
Nephew's characterization of ''esp2ceW as "the most horrid of all nick- 
names." In Diderot's text, Moi expresses wonder that Rameau can have such 
delicate discrimination and remarkable sensitivity in musical matters, but 
nevertheless can be "blind to the beauties of morality, so insensible to the 
charm of virtue." The Nephew attributes this failing either to his own natural 
constitution-"virtue requires a special sense that I lack, a fiber that has not 
been granted to mew---or to his upbringing-"I have spent my life with good 
musicians and bad people, whence my ear has become very sharp and my 
heart quite deaf." This prompts Moi to ask why Rameau isn't concerned to 
provide his son with an education that might check his family's natural 
disposition towards immorality. Rameau responds that if his son is destined 
35 Hegel, Werke, 111, 364-65 (Phenomenology, 298) quoting Goethe's translation 235 
(Fabre, 90; Barzun and Bowen, 72). 
36 Ibid., 111,403 (332) quoting Goethe's translation, 229 (Fabre 82; Barzun and Bowen 
66). 
''For discussions of this point see Jauss, 136-47, Hulbert, 276-83, and Price, 227-28. 
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to be a good man such an education would be useless, and if his son is 
destined for the life of a ne'er-do-well, such education would be harmful 
because his education and his natural inclinations would work at cross 
purposes and 
he would be pulled by two contrary forces that would make him go 
askew down the path of l i f e l i k e  so many others I see who are 
equally clumsy in good and evil deeds. They are the ones we call 
"types," [espice] the most frightening of all epithets because it 
indicates mediocrity and the lowest degree of contempt. A great 
scoundrel is a great scoundrel, but he isn't a "type."38 
In Diderot's text the Nephew suggests that the attempt to overcome the 
natural disposition through education breeds mediocre "types." Hegel, in 
contrast, employs the passage to argue that it is the merely "assumed 
existence" of natural, uneducated individuality that is stigmatized as-if not 
quite a "typev--then at least a "kind of being."39 
Hegel also alters the context of the two other quotations he employs. In 
the original context, the passage Hegel uses for his description of the triumph 
of the Enlightenment over Christianity is employed as a description of the 
way in which the Jesuits introduced Christianity into China, a description 
which the Nephew in turn uses as an analogy for the ultimate triumph of 
Italian musical styles over the Frenche40 The passage describing the Neph- 
ew's pantomime of operatic arias is completed by a quotation taken from 
Rameau's less extravagant, but more morally disquieting, pantomime of the 
Nephew's seducing of a young woman for his master. It is this panto- 
mime-and not the performance of operatic arias-that Moi sees as a "rig- 
marole of wisdom and folly," both appalling in its "absolute shamefulness" 
and striking in its "perfect frankness and truth."41 Here, as in the quotation 
involving the fallen idol, Hegel takes a passage that is concerned with 
aesthetic questions and redeploys it in a context where moral questions are at 
Goethes Werke, XXV, 235 (Fabre, 89-90; Barzun and Bowen, 71-72, translation 
modified). 
' 9  See Jauss, 138-39, and Herbert Dieckmann, "Diderots Le Neveu de Rameau und 
Hegels Interpretation des Werkes," Wolfenbutteler Forschungen, 10 (1980), 164-65. 
See Jauss, 143-44. 
4'  The passage cited in Hegel, Werke, 111, 387 (Phenomenology, 3 17-18) inserts p. 182 
of Goethe's translation (Fabre 24; Barzun and Bowen, 23) into the longer passage from p. 
23 1 (Fabre, 83; Barzun and Bowen, 67). Matters are further complicated by the presence of 
an unclosed (and misplaced) quotation mark in the Phenomenology. For discussions of 
Hegel's construction of this quotation see Jauss, 140-43, Price, 225-26, and Dieckmann, 
166-67. 
42 For a discussion, see Gearhart, 165-68. 
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Hegel's appropriation of Rameau 's Nephew in the Phenomenology de- 
parts from Diderot's original in one final respect. In his selections from the 
text Hegel pays almost no attention to the arguments that Moi advances 
against the Nephew. This emphasis on the Nephew is, to a degree, 
unremarkable. Just as Lui is the dominant figure in Rameau 's Nephew, so too 
the "lacerated consciousness" (zerrissene BewuJtsein) is central to Hegel's 
analysis. Yet Hegel diminishes the role of the "tranquil" or "simple" 
consciousness far below the role Moi plays in Diderot's dialogue. Hegel 
states that when faced with the utterances of the lacerated consciousness, the 
simple consciousness (einfachen BewuJtsein) "can be no more than mono- 
syllabic [einsilbig]" or can only repeat what the lacerated consciousness has 
already said, and "in so doing commits the folly of imagining that it is saying 
something new and different."43 
While Diderot's Moi is never as talkative as Lui and while there are 
several moments when Moi, appalled by what he is hearing from Lui, cuts off 
the discussion by changing the subject, Hegel's suggestion that Moi is 
progressively driven into silence by Lui is misleading. It is in fact precisely at 
the close of the dialogue that Moi energetically opposes Lui by drawing out 
the implications of Lui's account of the dependence of individuals upon one 
another in modern society and then insisting that it is only the philosopher 
who can escape from the "beggar's pantomime" and live freely. There may 
well be inadequacies in this defense of the philosophical life, but Moi is 
certainly capable of responding to Lui. It is Hegel's appropriation of Ra- 
meau's Nephew, and not Diderot's dialogue, that reduces the Moi to mono- 
syllables. 
The Phenomenology of Spirit thus effects what might be characterized as 
a second translation of Rameau 's Nephew. Into his own account of the "self- 
estranged spirit," Hegel wove the words Goethe used to translate Diderot's 
text, using them in ways that often ran counter to Goethe's understanding of 
the text he was translating. While for Goethe the Nephew's musical abilities 
had served to mitigate his moral depravity, for Hegel the Nephew's musical 
pantomimes, no less than his moral cynicism, expressed a consciousness that 
was lacerated, divided, and perverted. And while Goethe saw the wild 
pantomimes and erratic chatter of the Nephew as a condemnation of those 
who had attacked Diderot and his colleagues, in Hegel's retelling it is Lui, 
not Moi, who emerges triumphant. What are we to make of these differences? 
And does Hegel's transformation of Diderot's text hold up? 
V. Ernst Robert Curtius once argued that Goethe failed to understand 
Diderot's general intent because he neglected to pursue the clue Diderot 
provided when he employed a quotation from Horace's Satires as the motto 
43 Hegel, Werke 111, 387-88 (Phenomenology, 3 18, translation modified). 
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for Rameau's Nephew.44 The words "Vertumnis, quotquot sunt, natus ini- 
quis" ("Born when every single Verturnnis [the god who presides over the 
changing of the seasons and takes whatever form he desires] was out of 
sorts") are used by the slave Davus to describe the unstable Roman Senator 
Priscus, who for Davus illustrates that a man cannot be said to be free if he 
remains under the ever-changing the sway of the passions.45 In Curtius's 
reading, the Nephew's pantomimes are not-as Goethe would have it-a 
way of imparting individual characteristics to a figure intended to exemplify 
an entire species of flatterers and toadies. Instead they show us an individual 
who, like Priscus, is enslaved to the passions and to vice. True freedom can 
only be attained by Moi-identified by Curtius as "Denis le philosophe" 
-who proudly models himself on Diogenes and liberates himself from all 
d e p enden~e . ~~  
Curtius's interpretation of Rameau's Nephew as an affirmation of stoic 
virtues has raised as many difficulties as it re~olved.~' Yet his criticism of 
Goethe does call attention to a curious aspect of Goethe's reading. While 
there is now a well-established tradition of seeing RameauS Nephew as 
centrally concerned with the problem of what sort of moral philosophy is 
possible in the wake of the Enlightenment's relentless critique of traditional 
value~,4~Goethe himself does not appear to have thought that Rameau's 
Nephew was concerned with "morality" (Sittlichkeit) at all. He insisted that 
"No one belongs to the world as a moral man" and argued instead that it was 
"ability, activity, intellect, and talent" which bound an individual to oth- 
e r ~ . ~ ~Judgments about individual morality do not, for Goethe, fall within the 
province of society, but judgments about "ability, activity, intellect, and 
talent" are properly social concerns. Thus, in Goethe's reading, Rameau S 
Nephew is not concerned with the morality of Moi or Lui. Rather, in the 
Nephew, Diderot artfully constructed a figure capable of bringing the reader 
to judge the worth of the philosophes and their critics in terms of their 
contributions to society. 
It would be equally misleading, but for rather different reasons, to 
characterize Hegel's interpretation of RameauS Nephew as focusing on 
questions of "morality" in the peculiar sense in which Hegel employed the 
"Curtius, "Diderot and Horace," European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, tr. 
Willard R. Task (New York, 1953), 573-83. 
45 See Michael Bernstein, Bitter Carnival: Ressentiment and the Abject Hero 
(Princeton, 1992), 60. 
46 Curtius, 582. 
47 See Herbert Dieckmann, "The Relationship between Diderot's Satire I and Satire 
II," Romanic Review, 43 (1952), 12-26, and the discussion in Jauss, 12 1 .  
48 For the classic version of this argument see Carl Becker, "The Dilemma of 
Diderot," Philosophical Review, 24 (1915), 54-71. For two recent formulations of it, see 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Afrer Virtue (Notre Dame, 1981), 45-50, and Mark Hulliung, The 
Autocritique of Enlightenment: Rousseau and the Philosophes (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 
94- 106. 
49 Goethe, Rameaus Neffe, 285. 
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term. One of the main concerns of the Phenomenology's chapter on "Geist" 
was to draw a distinction between what Hegel termed Sittlichkeit (usually 
translated as "ethical life") and Moralitat. Hegel used Moralitat to designate 
judgments that appeal to individual intentions and to conscience. This form 
of judgment, which Hegel associates with Kantian moral philosophy, re- 
sembles what Goethe seems to ha;:e had in mind when he argued that the 
question of whether an individual had fulfilled the demands of what he 
termed Sittlichkeit was best decided by God, by the individual's own heart, 
and by "those to whom he is true and good."50 Hegel, however, distin- 
guished Sittlichkeit from Moralitat and consistently reserved the former term 
for that type of evaluation which takes its point of reference from the role 
individuals occupy as members of particular ethical communities. For ex- 
ample (to cite the case that serves as Hegel's locus classicus), in ancient 
Athens, the obligation to bury one's brother is neither a matter of "love" nor 
of "feeling" nor an action that is justified by an appeal to conscience. It is 
instead a responsibility that flows directly from one's membership in a 
family-a "natural ethical c~mmunity."~'  What fascinated Hegel about 
Sophocles' Antigone was that in Antigone he found an individual who 
consciously carried out her ethical duties, and was thus uniquely able to bring 
to full awareness the contradictory demands which are made on her by 
Creon's dictates and by her duties to P ~ l y n i c e s . ~ ~  
The world of the Nephew, however, is neither the world of ethical 
community nor the world of the Kantian moral subject. Bildung is instead a 
world that is "doubled, divided, and self-opposed."53 Accordingly, Hegel's 
analysis of culture's "realm of actuality" (Reich der Wirklichkeit) involves 
the unfolding of a series of dichotomies, culminating in the juxtaposition of 
Diderot's Lui and Moi. Hegel offers a sketch of the political life of early 
modern Europe that focuses on the opposition between "state power" and 
"wealth."54 Under the absolutist state individuals are bound together directly 
and immediately and whatever "individuality" they possess is expressed in 
their status as members of a political community living under a system of 
positive laws.55 The system of "wealth" allows for a more "mediated type 
of unity. In an argument that owes much to Adam Smith, Hegel suggests that 
the individual's pursuit of private and particular ends ultimately leads to the 
insight that "in working for himself he is at the same time working for all and 
all are working for him."56 This tension between state power and wealth 
gives rise to two rather different forms of consciousness: a "noble" (edel- 
50 Ibid.,285. 
5 1  Hegel, Werke, 111, 328-34 (Phenomenology, 266-72). 
5Z Ibid.,111, 347-49 (283-84). 
53 Ibid.,111, 361 (293). 
54 For a discussion of Hegel's account, see Lewis Hinchman, Hegel's Critique of the 
Enlightenment (Gainesville, 1984), 104- 15. 
55 Hegel, Werke, 111, 367-68 (300-301). 
56 Hegel, Werke, 111, 368 (Phenomenologv, 302). 
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mutige) consciousness which aligns itself with state power, embraces it as its 
"good," and looks askance at the world of wealth, and a "base" (nieder-
trichtige) consciousness which "sees in the sovereign power a fetter" and 
seeks satisfaction in the pursuit of wealth. The base consciousness pays lip 
service to state power, all the while nourishing a "secret malice" which 
keeps it "always on the point of revolt." 
Its relationship with wealth, however, is no more satisfying than its 
relation to the state. All that its pursuit of material well-being produces is a 
consciousness of itself as "an isolated individual," blessed with but a 
"transitory enjoyment" of riches which it comes to both love and hate.57 The 
"noble" consciousness, having renounced wealth and possessions in order to 
devote itself to a "heroism of service," comes to an equally unhappy end. As 
a "haughty vassal," acting in the name of state power, it knows itself to be 
"esteemed" in the "general opinion," but it never experiences that "grati- 
tude" which only a specific individual could grant. Speaking a "language of 
counsel," and allegedly advancing only the general interests of the commu- 
nity, its "chatter about the general good" in fact conceals a concern for "its 
own best interest." Even a vassal who undergoes the supreme sacrifice for 
the state, risking death in its defense, emerges from the brush with death with 
only a "particular self-interest": the preservation of his own e x i s t e n ~ e . ~ ~  
Thus at the end of this stage of Hegel's account, the noble consciousness, no 
less than the base, maintains a contradiction between its own particular 
interests and those of the state. It too, like the base consciousness, remains 
always on the point of revolt.59 
What Hegel seeks is a renunciation of individuality that will be as 
complete as that which results from death in service to the state, but which 
nevertheless allows the individual to survive the act of renunciation. He finds 
this renunciation accomplished through the medium of lang~age.~'  It is only 
within the universal and anonymous system of pronouns that individuals can 
assert their particularity, and this claim of uniqueness and particularity can be 
successful only if it is understood as but one instance of the general category 
of "assertions of individuality." Through an act of self-alienation in which 
allegedly unique and individual experiences are articulated within an 
intersubjectively shared system of communication, "the pure I" at last 
obtains the recognition of others. 
Having now shifted the locus of analysis from consciousness to lan- 
guage, Hegel reformulates the relationship of the noble consciousness to state 
power in terms of a contrast between two "moments of language": "the 
abstract universal, called 'the general good' " and "the pure self" which, 
57 {bid.,111, 372 (305). 
Ibid.,111, 373-75 (306-7). Hegel here recapitulates themes initially introduced in the 
well-known account of the dialectic of master and slave. 
59 Ibid.,111, 375 (307). 
"O Ibid.,111, 375-76 (308). 
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serving the state, disavows all consciousness of its particular e~is tence .~ '  
Initially, the two remain as alien from each other as before. The "pure self" 
has won no real power from the state, all it receives is "honor," while state 
power, insofar as it is merely a "general good" that is in everyone's interest, 
lacks the ability to will or to decide.62 It is only within a form of discourse 
which Hegel dubs the "language of flattery" that the contradiction between 
the interests of the individual and the general good are, to a degree, mitigated. 
The "heroism of silent service" is replaced by a "heroism of flattery" in 
which the nobility comes to play the purely "ornamental" function of 
surrounding the throne of an "unlimited monarch," constantly reassuring its 
occupant that his rule is indeed universal. The monarch, set off from every- 
one else by virtue of his "name," accomplishes the task of giving state power 
a recognizable identity through the use of the first person singular-"L 'Etat 
c'est m ~ i . " ~ ~  
This, then, is the world in which Jean-Franqois Rameau performs his 
"beggar's pantomime." Dependent on the monarch for its livelihood, the 
noble consciousness is reduced to the same status as the base conscious- 
n e ~ s . ~ ~In a world where wealth rules, where those with riches suppose that 
"they have procured another's self through the gift of a meal" and remain 
oblivious to the seething resentment and barely suppressed rebellion of those 
they have allegedly purchased, only the "lacerated consciousness" speaks 
the t r ~ t h . ~ '  Thus, Rameau, surveying the motley crew assembled at Bertin's 
table for a free meal, muses aloud that the current guest of honor will soon 
have to give up his place at the head of the table, like others who have sat 
there before him, and will eventually have to take his place beside Rameau, 
"another poor bugger like you who siedo sempre come un maestoso cazzo fra 
duoi ~ og l i o n i . " ~~  The circulation of guests at Bertin's table mimics the fate of 
all demarcations within the world of Bildung: like cash, they are always 
exchangeable. The "lacerated consciousness" recognizes that "neither the 
actuality of power and wealth nor their specific concepts, 'good' and 'bad,' 
or the consciousness of 'good' and 'bad' (the noble and the ignoble con- 
sciousness), possess truth." The ultimate power in the world of Bildung is 
instead that "disintegrative play" (auflosende Spiel) of discourse and judg- 
ment which-like Rameau's rude quip-penetrates all the pretensions of 
61 Ibid., 111, 378 (310). 
Ibid., 111, 377-78 (310). 
63 Ibid., 111, 378 (310-1 1). For a discussion, see Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure 
of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. S .  Cherniak and J. Heckman (Evanston, 1974), 
404-6. 
64 Ibid., 111, 381 (312-13). Hinchman, 115, sees this as an allusion to the noblesse de 
robe, drawn to monarch because of the positions he could offer them. 
65 Ibid., 111, 383-84 (315). 
"Goethe, Rameaus Neffe, 2213 (Fabre, 63; Barzun and Bowen, 51). Bertin's mistress 
is-appropriately enough-"penetrie de la veritk" of Rameau's comparison, but Bertin, 
outraged, banishes him from the table. 
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culture and strips the significance from everything it addresses. While the 
"honest consciousness" still clings to a faith in the objective reality of those 
things that are wittily talked about, the "lacerated consciousness" recognizes 
that this destructive chatter rules the world of ~ul ture .~ '  
For Hegel there thus is no point in distinguishing what Rameau has to say 
about musical matters from what he says about morality. What is important 
in the figure of Rameau is the particular stance he takes towards the entire 
world of culture. Rameau's views on music, like his views on morality, are 
governed by a single interest: self-preservation. In teaching music, his pri- 
mary interest lies not in teaching his student to play the harpsichord but rather 
in making sure that the student's family will continue to pay for his services. 
When he reads Theophastus, La Bruyere, and Moliere he does not derive 
moral lessons of the sort that moved Moi to praise them as "excellent 
books." Instead, he learns strategies for survival in a world where language 
and action have become completely disconnected and one must learn 
what to do and what not to say. When I read The Miser, I say to 
myself: "Be as miserly as you like, but don't talk like the miser." 
When I read Tartufle, I say: "Be a hypocrite if you choose, but don't 
talk like one." Keep any useful vices, but don't acquire the tone and 
air which would make you ridiculous. Vice offends men only from 
time to time; but the symptoms of vice offend day and night.68 
The Nephew inhabits a world where virtues have been separated from the 
institutions which once defined and required them. What one is and how one 
appears are now-as Rousseau had argued in the Discourse on the Arts and 
Sciences-two different things. In such a world, everyone takes up their 
positions and dances their pantomimes in a vain effort to survive. It is for this 
reason, perhaps, that Hegel could not take Moi's endorsement of Stoic virtues 
any more seriously than the Nephew did. In the world of the self-estranged 
spirit someone who imitates Diogenes has not exempted himself from the 
"beggar's pantomimew-withdrawing from the world is but another way of 
taking up a position within the world. And for Nephew it is not a particularly 
attractive one. 
What matters to Hegel about the Nephew, then, is less what he has to say 
than the way in which he says it. "The language of laceration," Hegel writes, 
"is the perfect language and the authentic existent Spirit of this entire world 
of culture."69 What must have struck Hegel upon first encountering 
Rameau's Nephew was the remarkable polyphony of voices and topics that 
ran through the dialogue. If Antigone brought to full consciousness the ten- 
sion in the ancient ethical community between the demands of the polity and 
67 Hegel, Werke, 111, 385-86 (Phenomenology, 316-17). 
Goethe, Rameaus Neffe, 21 1 (Fabre, 60; Barzun and Bowen, 49-50). 
69 Hegel, Werke, 111, 384 (Phenomenology, 3 16). 
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the demands of the household, then Rameau S Nephew showed him a world 
that was so divided against itself that one could scarcely begin to map the 
lines of conflict. Tragedy was possible in Antigone's world because agents 
have clearly defined roles to play and duties to perform. Whatever it is that is 
going on in Rameau's Nephew, it is something other than tragedy. 
VI. "When one tells a story," Diderot reminds his reader at the start of 
"This is Not a Story," "there has to be someone to listen; and if the story 
runs to any length, it is rare for the storyteller not sometimes to be interrupted 
by his listener."70 Diderot was acutely aware that all narratives are haunted 
by a host of contingencies. Speakers in Diderot's dialogues continually 
interrupt one another, stumble into dead ends, and sometimes completely 
lose track of their argument. We should count ourselves lucky that we 
eventually learn what it was that led to Rameau's being expelled from 
Bertin's table. After all, in Jacques the Fatalist and His Master, we never 
hear the conclusion of the story of Jacques's loves. Reading Diderot is not 
like listening to a lecture; it is more like going to a ~a rn iva l .~ 'In The 
Indiscreet Jewels a twist of a magic ring starts women's genitalia chattering 
about what they have been up to. One of the voices in DIAlembert's Dream 
issues from a man ranting in his sleep, replaying in distorted form a conversa- 
tion that took place earlier in the dialogue. Towards the end of The Paradox 
of the Actor we find ourselves listening to one of the speakers carry on an 
internal dialogue without our being entirely clear as to who is speaking. The 
narrator of Jacques the Fatalist threatens to abandon Jacques and his master 
and follow a character who has just passed through a scene. And when 
Jacques and his master fall asleep at the end of the second chapter, the 
narrator joins them, leaving us alone to stare at the blank page and wonder 
what is going on while they are all snoring. 
Hegel's taste in narratives was considerably tamer than Diderot's. While 
he acknowledged Diderot's mastery of the dialogue form, he nevertheless 
maintained that in an ideal dialogue there must be one interlocutor who 
"holds all the strings of progress" and thus remains master over the conver- 
sation. For Hegel a well-formed dialogue is organized around a clearly laid 
out sequence of questions and answers which have the result of directing 
attention not simply to the final conclusion but also secures acquiescence on 
every step towards that conclusion.72 A reader who approaches Rameau S 
Nephew expecting a dialogue of this sort will be disappointed. While the 
discussion does progress through a number of different topics, it is difficult 
to find a single over-arching order to the discussion. Nor is there a clear 
conclusion to be drawn at the end. The dialogue's closing line-"He who 
70 Diderot, This is Not a Story and Other Stories, tr. P .  N .  Furbank (Columbia, Mo., 
1991), 17. 
7'  For this reason, few recent studies of Diderot manage to avoid mentioning Bakhtin. 
72 Hegel, Werke, XI, 269-70. See the discussion in Hulbert, 275-76. 
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laughs last, laughs best9'-leaves us utterly in the dark as to who will have 
the final laugh after the two interlocutors part. 
In Rameau's Nephew there are three voices, not two,73 a frequently 
overlooked point that, if pursued, allows us to appreciate the tension which 
persists, in spite of Hegel's efforts at appropriation, between Rameau's 
Nephew and the Phenomenology. The words spoken by Lui and Moi are set 
out in dialogue form, introduced only by these pronouns and a dash. But at 
other times, a third voice intrudes, providing a narrative that describes the 
Nephew's pantomimes, recounts the setting of the dialogue, and reports 
Moi's reactions to Lui's utterances. Because this third voice has access to 
Moi's feelings and thoughts, we easily assume that this narrator must be Moi. 
This overlooks a small but important difference. If the narrator is indeed Moi, 
it is Moi after the encounter with Lui. The narrator is recounting a conversa- 
tion that has taken place in the past, offering a transcript of the words that 
were spoken and a description of Lui's actions and Moi's reactions. 
When Hegel incorporated portions of Rameau's Nephew into the Phe- 
nomenology, he performed a type of translation across genres that he had 
practiced on a number of other occasions: he recast Diderot's dialogue into 
expository prose.74 Where Diderot closed the dialogue without deciding who 
had carried the argument, in Hegel's transformation of the dialogue the 
Nephew has the last laugh, while the "peaceful consciousness" is reduced to 
silence. The Nephew is so clearly for Hegel the dominant figure that very 
phrase Hegel uses to describe the world of culture-"Entfremdung des 
GeistesW--is the same phase Goethe used to translate "alienation d'esprit" 
-which was used in the French original to characterize the condition of the 
Nephew during his furious pantomime of operatic arias.75 For Hegel, the 
Nephew is not simply a "lacerated consciousness" (zewissene BewuJtsein); 
he is also the "consciousness of inversion" (BewuJtsein der Vehrkehr~ng) .~~ 
Spirit discloses itself in language as "the inversion of all concepts and 
realities, the universal deception of itself and others; and the shamelessness 
which gives utterance to this deception is just for that reason the greatest 
The terms Hegel employs to describe the Nephew echo earlier parts 
of the Phenomenology. In describing Rameau as a zerrissene BewuJtsein, 
Hegel recalls the discussion in the Introduction of how consciousness tears 
itself to pieces in the course of its Bildung, while the phrase BewuJtsein der 
Vehrkehr invokes the closing chapter of the first section of the Phenomenol- 
ogy, in which the "inverted wo r l d  (verkehrte Welt) is juxtaposed to a 
"tranquil kingdom of laws" (ruhige Reich der G e~ e t z e ) . ~ ~  These parallels in 
73 See Hulbert, 278. 
74 For a discussion, see Smith, 2 1 1. 
75 Goethes Werke, XXV, 230 (Fabre, 83; Barzun and Bowen, 67). 
76 Hegel, Werke, 111, 386 (Phenomenology, 3 17). 
77 Ibid., 111, 386-87 (317). 
78 Hegel, Werke, 111, 128-36 (Phenomenology, 97-103). Price (226-27) offers a brief 
discussion of the "associative link" between the "inverted world" and Rameau's Nephew. 
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terminology suggest an affinity between Rameau 's Nephew and the Phenom- 
enology that goes beyond the use of the Nephew to illustrate a particular, and 
now superseded, form of consciousness. Just as the section of the Phenom- 
enology that analyzes the "actuality" of Bildung attributes to a particular 
historical period the more general process by which the Spirit's "Bildung" is 
accomplished, so too the figure that epitomizes this process, the "lacerated" 
and "inverted" consciousness of the Nephew, is something more than just 
another image in Hegel's picture gallery. He personifies the central lesson of 
the dialectic: nothing remains true, since all certitudes must be abandoned on 
the path of doubt and despair down which consciousness relentlessly plods. 
To the extent that the Nephew epitomizes not just the world of the "self- 
estranged spirit," but rather the very movement of the dialectic itself, 
Diderot's erratic musician threatens to escape across the boundaries Hegel 
had drawn around him. 
While Hegel minimizes Moi as a participant in the debate, he was 
nevertheless aware of the role Moi played within the narrative structure of 
Rameau 's Nephew as the figure responsible for recounting the entire conver- 
~at ion. '~The "peaceful consciousness" has no particular insight into the 
world of culture. Unlike the "lacerated consciousness" it has not suffered 
"the feeling that all its defenses have broken down, that every part of its 
being has been tortured on the rack and every bone broken." But it alone can 
collect, comprehend, present the witty insights of the "lacerated conscious- 
ne~s."~OThe Nephew can pass judgments on everything, he can express the 
perversions and inversions of the world of Bildung, but he lacks the ability to 
comprehend what he has said.81 Here, too, there are affinities with the broader 
argument of the Phenomenology itself. 
Like Rameau's Nephew, the Phenomenology might be characterized as a 
compendium of insights, uttered by a multitude of speakers, and brought 
together by a narrator who simply collects and organizes what has been said 
into a unified whole. In the Phenomenology, as in Rameau's Nephew, there 
are three voices. Hegel sometimes provides an account of how something 
appears "fiir es," that is, how something appears to the consciousness which 
undergoes that which is being recollected. At other times, Hegel describes 
how something appears "fiir uns." how it appears to the narrator and to the 
reader who is following the narration. Finally, Hegel sometimes character- 
izes a description as capturing how something is "an sich," how something 
is "in itself." In a move that reduces these three standpoints to two, Hegel 
consistently opposes the characterizations that are "for it" to those which are 
"in itself" and consistently identifies the standpoint of the "in itself" with 
79 This has been appreciated by Roger Laufer, "Structure et Signification du 'Neveu de 
Rameau' de Diderot," Revue des sciences humaines, 100 (1960), 400. 
Hegel, Werke, 111, 398-99 (Phenomenology, 328-29).
" [bid., 111, 390 (320). 
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the "for us."'* The narrator and the reader thus come to occupy the comfort- 
able position of knowing the intrinsic truth of that which the experiencing 
consciousness can only know from its own limited perspective. The narrator 
in the Phenomenology occupies a temporal position roughly analogous to the 
narrator in Rameau S Nephew. In both the narrator recollects a sequence of 
incidents that have already occurred. But where the narrator in Rameau's 
Nephew claims privileged access to only one standpoint in the discus- 
sion-Moi's perspective-the narrator of the Phenomenology purports to 
recount not simply how things appeared to us, but also how things really 
were. It is precisely this claim that has proven difficult for today's readers to 
accept, at least in part because we have learned, most notably from Diderot 
himself, to be suspicious of narrators who claim to know everything, to tell 
us everything, and never to fall asleep. 
It would be much too facile to pose the tension between the Phenomenol- 
ogy and Rameau 's Nephew in terms of an opposition between a narrative that 
is "closed" and "totalizing" and a narrative that is "open" and "dialogi- 
~ a l . " ~ ~Diderot, no less than Hegel, was moved by the dream of encyclopedic 
unity and devoted a considerable portion of his energy to pursuits that the 
Nephew would have scorned. Hegel, no less than Diderot, had a passion for 
the unique and the particular-indeed, his contemporaries often denounced 
his empiricism and materiali~m.'~ If it is difficult to see how Hegel could 
have confined the corrosive energy of the "self-estranged spirit" to one part 
of the Phenomenology, it is equally difficult to see how the wild chatter of 
Rameau's Nephew could have been kept from infecting the solemn pages of 
Diderot's Encyclopedia-perhaps that is why Diderot kept the manuscript 
locked in a drawer. For both Hegel and Diderot the great challenge of the 
Enlightenment remained the order of the day: to remain faithful to the 
"systematic spirit" without falling prey to the sterile "system of spirit." 
When Hegel read Rameau 's Nephew, perhaps he found something more than 
another picture for his gallery of images. In its creator he might well have 
recognized a kindred spirit. 
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